An enterprise AI agent rarely fails on its own reasoning alone. More often it calls a search tool, a pricing API, a document retrieval system, or another agent entirely, and the failure originates somewhere in that chain rather than in the orchestrating agent's own logic. Whether your AI liability policy responds to that scenario depends on wording most policyholders have not actually read closely. This article sets out how third-party technology exclusions interact with agentic tool calling, what you remain liable for regardless of where the fault sits, and what underwriters are starting to ask for before they will price the gap away.
Key takeaways
- Does AI insurance cover damage from a third-party tool my agent calls? Usually only if the policy's definition of the insured system is drafted broadly enough to include tool calls, which many current AI liability policies are not yet drafted to do explicitly.
- Third-party technology exclusions, standard in technology errors and omissions cover, were written for a world of vendor software, not agentic tool calling, and can exclude a claim even where your agent, not the tool vendor, is what the customer actually interacted with.
- You remain liable to your customer regardless of which internal component caused the failure. Directive 2024/2853's joint and several liability provision under Article 8 reinforces this at the regulatory level for EU-facing deployments.
- Underwriters are increasingly asking for a call graph: a documented map of every tool, plugin, or agent endpoint the insured system can invoke, the permissions each call carries, and the checkpoints between a tool response and any resulting action.
- Standardised protocols such as Anthropic's Model Context Protocol and Google's Agent2Agent protocol do not change what is covered, but they make the call graph easier to produce, which supports more precise underwriting rather than a blanket exclusion applied for lack of visibility.
The scenario underwriters are only beginning to price
Consider an agent that handles a customer's refund request. The agent itself reasons correctly: it identifies the customer, confirms eligibility, and decides a refund is warranted. It then calls a payments tool to process the transaction. The payments tool, built and maintained by a separate vendor, has a bug that processes the refund at the wrong amount. From the customer's perspective, your business made an error. From an insurance perspective, the question of whether your policy responds depends on whether "your AI system" as defined in the policy schedule includes the payments tool the agent called, or stops at the boundary of the agent's own model and orchestration logic.
This is not a marginal scenario. Agentic systems are built specifically to call external tools, plugins, and increasingly other agents, because that is how they extend beyond what a language model alone can do. A pricing lookup, an inventory check, a document retrieval step, a booking confirmation: each of these is commonly delegated to a tool or a sub-agent rather than handled by the orchestrating model directly. The insurance question this creates, whether coverage follows the customer-facing agent or stops at an internal architectural boundary the customer never sees, is one most enterprises binding AI liability cover in 2026 have not yet asked their broker directly.
How third-party technology exclusions were built, and why they do not fit cleanly
Third-party technology exclusions are a long-standing feature of technology errors and omissions policies, designed to exclude claims arising from software, platforms, or services the policyholder did not build and does not control, most commonly a subcontractor's or vendor's product embedded in the policyholder's offering. The logic behind the exclusion predates agentic AI by decades: an insurer writing a policy for your software business does not want to also underwrite every vendor whose component you happen to integrate, and expects you to seek recovery from that vendor separately if their component fails.
Applied literally to an agentic AI system, this exclusion can produce a result that tracks the technical architecture rather than the commercial reality. If a customer-facing agent's failure traces back to a called tool the policyholder licensed rather than built, a narrowly drafted exclusion can remove coverage for the loss even though the customer has no relationship with the tool vendor at all and holds the policyholder, not the vendor, responsible. The exclusion was written to protect insurers from underwriting unrelated third-party products bundled into an offering. Applied to an agent's own tool calls, which the deployer specifically chose to wire into the customer experience, it can instead remove coverage for exactly the kind of loss the policy was purchased to address.
What you remain liable for regardless of where the fault sits
The coverage question and the liability question are separate, and conflating them is the most common mistake operators make when reviewing this risk. Your liability to the customer does not depend on which internal component of your system caused the failure. The customer's contract, and any duty of care they are owed, runs to your business, not to a tool vendor several layers removed from the interaction they actually had. This is the same principle established in Moffatt v. Air Canada, where the tribunal rejected the argument that a chatbot's statements could be treated as originating from a separate, disclaimable party.
For EU-facing deployments, Directive 2024/2853, the revised Product Liability Directive, reinforces this at the regulatory level. Article 8 provides that where multiple economic operators are each responsible for the same damage, they are jointly and severally liable, meaning a claimant can recover in full from any one of them.[1] A customer harmed by a failure that technically originated in a called tool can still pursue the deploying operator for the full loss, leaving the operator to seek contribution from the tool vendor separately, a process that takes time and is not guaranteed to succeed. The practical result is that your liability exposure is not reduced by the fact that a tool, not your own agent's core logic, caused the failure. Only your insurance coverage for that exposure is potentially reduced, and only if the policy is drafted narrowly.
What underwriters are starting to ask for
As this gap has become more visible, AI liability underwriters, including those writing under the AIUC-1 standard and Lloyd's syndicates handling bespoke enterprise programmes, are increasingly requesting a call graph as part of the underwriting submission: a documented inventory of every tool, plugin, and third-party agent endpoint the insured system can invoke, the data access and permissions each call carries, and the checkpoints, human or automated, that sit between a tool's response and any consequential action taken on it. This is the same evidence base described in our companion analysis of how certification assessments handle multi-agent and tool-calling systems on agentcertified.eu, and the overlap is not a coincidence: underwriters and certification assessors are converging on the same evidence because it answers the same underlying question, namely what can this system actually do once every call it is capable of making is accounted for.
A submission that can produce this call graph clearly is positioned to negotiate a policy definition of the insured system that follows the customer-facing outcome rather than stopping at an internal architectural boundary, because the underwriter can see exactly what is being priced. A submission that cannot produce it is more likely to face either a narrow definition that excludes tool-originated losses by default, or a broad exclusion applied conservatively because the underwriter cannot otherwise size the exposure. This is the same governance-documentation dynamic already established for AI liability underwriting generally, discussed in our guide to preparing an AI agent underwriting submission, applied specifically to the tool-calling layer of the system.
Do standardised protocols change what is covered
Standardised agent-to-agent and tool-calling protocols, including Anthropic's Model Context Protocol and Google's Agent2Agent protocol, do not themselves change what a given insurance policy covers. What they change is how easily the call graph underwriters want can be produced. A system built on a standardised protocol typically exposes its tool and agent inventory in a structured, inspectable form, rather than in custom integration code whose actual call paths exist only in an engineering team's institutional knowledge. That structured visibility supports a more precise underwriting conversation and a policy definition negotiated with the real system in view, rather than a conservative default applied because the underwriter could not otherwise see what they were being asked to price.
What to check before you assume you are covered
Three checks are proportionate for any enterprise operating an agentic system with meaningful tool-calling behaviour. First, ask your broker directly how the policy defines the insured AI system, and specifically whether that definition extends to tools, plugins, and agent endpoints the system calls, or is limited to the core model and orchestration logic. Second, request the exact wording of any third-party technology exclusion and have it reviewed against your actual architecture, not a generic description of your product. Third, prepare a call graph of your system's tool and agent dependencies before your next renewal or new placement, both because it is the evidence underwriters increasingly want and because producing it will itself surface gaps in your own understanding of what your system can actually do. For the regulatory backdrop that makes this exposure real regardless of policy wording, see the Article 25 value chain responsibilities guide on agentliability.eu, and for SME-scale coverage options addressing a related version of this question, see does my AI chatbot need separate insurance on insureyouragent.com.
Frequently asked questions
Does AI agent insurance cover damage caused by a third-party tool or plugin my agent calls?
Usually only if the policy is written to cover it, and many are not yet. Standalone AI liability products from carriers such as Armilla and Munich Re aiSure are generally drafted around the deployer's own AI system, and whether a failure that originates in a called third-party tool or plugin falls inside that definition depends on the specific policy wording for covered technology and any third-party technology exclusion. This is a question to put to your broker directly before binding, not an assumption to carry into a claim.
What is a third-party technology exclusion and does it apply to AI tool calls?
A third-party technology exclusion removes coverage for losses arising from software, systems, or services the policyholder did not build and does not control, commonly used in technology errors and omissions policies to exclude claims arising from a subcontractor's or vendor's product. Whether this exclusion applies to an AI agent's tool call depends on how the policy defines the insured AI system: if the definition is drawn narrowly around the agent's own model and logic, a failure originating in a called external tool may fall outside it and trigger the exclusion, even though the agent, not the tool vendor, is what the customer actually dealt with.
Am I still liable to my customer if the failure originated in a tool I did not build?
Generally yes. Your customer has a relationship with your agent, not with the third-party tool it called internally, and courts have consistently held deployers responsible for what their customer-facing systems do regardless of which internal component caused the failure. Under EU law, Article 8 of Directive 2024/2853 additionally provides that where multiple economic operators contribute to the same damage, they are jointly and severally liable, meaning your customer can pursue you in full even where a tool vendor also bears some responsibility.
What evidence do underwriters want about my agent's tool-calling behaviour?
Increasingly, a call graph: a documented map of every tool, plugin, or third-party agent endpoint the insured system can invoke, what data or permissions each call carries, and what checkpoint sits between a tool's response and any action taken on it. Underwriters use this to distinguish a well-scoped agent that calls a small number of narrowly permissioned tools from an agent with open-ended tool access, which carries materially different tail risk even if both are marketed as the same product.
Does using a standardised protocol like MCP or A2A make this easier to insure?
It can help on the evidence side. Standardised agent-to-agent and tool-calling protocols make it more straightforward to produce the call graph and permission map underwriters are asking for, because the tool and agent inventory is exposed in a structured, inspectable form rather than existing only in custom integration code. This does not change what is covered in a given policy, but it can shorten the underwriting submission process and support a more precise scope definition.
References
- Directive (EU) 2024/2853 on liability for defective products. Article 8, joint and several liability where multiple economic operators are responsible for the same damage. Applicable from 9 December 2026.
- Moffatt v. Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149 (BC Civil Resolution Tribunal, February 2024).
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 on Artificial Intelligence (EU AI Act). Article 25, value chain responsibilities.
- Anthropic. Model Context Protocol specification, released November 2024.
- Google. Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol, announced April 2025, contributed to the Linux Foundation.
- Artificial Intelligence Underwriting Company (AIUC). AIUC-1, a security, safety and reliability standard for AI agents. aiuc.com.